Binary fault localization is important for vulnerability analysis, but many current techniques face problems in locating vulnerability accurately and effectively, especially for real-world programs. In this paper, we propose a novel gradient-guided vulnerability locating method named DeepVL, which leverages deep neural networks to diagnose the root cause of weakness in binaries and provide guidance information for further analysis. DeepVL collects sufficient amounts of crashed execution traces and normal execution traces as input of the constructed neural networks. Based on trained neural network, DeepVL calculates the gradient information for each basic block in traces and filter out the vulnerable basic blocks according to corresponding gradients. To demonstrate the applicability of DeepVL, we perform plenty of experiments on different datasets. According to the experimental results on Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) dataset, DeepVL could locate different types of vulnerabilities accurately and effectively, with recall@10 reaching 96.9% and precision@10 reaching 70.1%. Additionally, the results on Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC) program and LibTIFF 4.0.10 show that DeepVL is capable of locating vulnerable basic blocks in large-scale programs. As a fault localization tool, DeepVL could greatly reduce the manual effort of finding vulnerabilities in binaries.
I. INTRODUCTION
Binary program vulnerability is an important research topic of software security, and also a hotspot of cyber security. According to the research, a large number of software vulnerabilities are discovered every day, causing serious harm to computer systems and program security [1] . How to detect, locate and eliminate vulnerabilities efficiently have always been the focus in the field of software security.
Vulnerability that occurs in binary software is one of the most common vulnerabilities encountered in reality. Locating vulnerabilities in binary programs is quite tricky and timeconsuming. Researchers have to spend a lot of time on finding and fixing vulnerabilities in programs every year, which also wastes much financial resources [2] , [3] . At present, most fault localization techniques debug with tools manually or rely on human vulnerable experiences to locate weakness. Since programs are larger and much more complex nowadays, making it more difficult to perform manual The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Muhammad Imran Tariq. debugging, these manual methods are time-consuming, laborintensive, and highly demanding on the ability of developers, which is inefficient for analysis [4] .
With the reason that most real-world software cannot obtain the source code-only the binary files are available, it is important to research the binary fault localization approaches suitable for large-scale programs. Due to the unavailability of source code information, it is difficult to leverage code audit or many approaches relied on source code. Many realworld binaries are processed with code obfuscation and pack to prevent the software from being modified and decompiled. Additionally, the real-world programs usually face large number of execution branches and high complexity of call relationships, which brings serious problem for dynamic analysis techniques such as dynamic taint and dynamic symbolic execution. These approaches are restricted due to execution path explosion and complex symbolic constraints when analyzing large-scale software. Therefore, locating vulnerability in binaries has encountered serious challenges.
In order to improve the efficiency and accuracy of fault localization, especially when facing large-scale programs, we leverage deep neural networks techniques to locate vulnerabilities in binary software. In recent years, the artificial intelligence technology, especially deep neural networks, has been gradually applied in the field of program analysis [5] , such as malware classification [6] , [7] , source code analysis [8] , and function recognition [9] , [10] . However, there are significant challenges for applying deep neural networks in binary vulnerabilities analysis. Since the structures of neural networks are quite complex, containing thousands or millions of parameters, it is difficult to determine the contribution of one parameter to achieving the task, which means that it is usually tricky to obtain a well-fitted neural network for a specific task [11] . Additionally, collecting sufficient program behaviors as datasets for deep neural networks could be quite challenging. Since the training effects of deep neural networks is heavily relied on the datasets, it brings much problems to express complex program behaviors for a neural network with the limited amount of datasets [12] .
In view of the difficulties in locating vulnerabilities in binaries and the limitations of current methods, we aim to design a fault localization method to diagnose the weakness in binaries based on control flow information, which could provide guidance for detailed vulnerability analysis and reduce manually workload. In this paper, we propose a novel method based on deep neural networks. According to the method, we develop a fault localization tool DeepVL for locating vulnerabilities in binaries. We collect a large amount of execution traces, and construct neural networks (NNs) to fit them. Then, we calculate the gradient information based on trained network to screen out vulnerable basic blocks. Experiments show that the proposed method could locate different types of vulnerabilities and weakness in real-world programs, which greatly improves the efficiency and accuracy. The main contributions of the article are as follows.
1) Based on relevant mathematical theory and NN knowledge, this paper infers the feasibility of selecting the vulnerable basic blocks in the crash execution trace according to gradient information. 2) For the first time, this paper proposes a novel method combining gradient information of NNs to diagnose the locations of bugs in binaries. Moreover, a fault localization tool DeepVL is designed and implemented. 3) This paper constructs a multi-layer network based on convolutional neural networks to fit the execution traces. Also, we propose and compare two embedding methods to model the execution traces. 4) This paper designs and performs sufficient experiments to verify the accuracy and effectiveness of the method. By detecting vulnerabilities in CWE datasets, we validate the accuracy and applicability for various types of vulnerabilities. Applied to CGC datasets and LibTIFF 4.0.10, the applicability of DeepVL on realworld programs has been proved. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II mainly introduces the related research on binary fault localization. Section III proves the feasibility of selecting vulnerable basic blocks based on gradient information theoretically. Section IV introduces the design methods of DeepVL. Section V elaborates the implementations of fault localization methods thoroughly. Section VI shows the specific experimental results, and Section VII gives a comprehensive evaluation of the method proposed in this paper. Finally, Section VIII concludes this paper and proposes future improvement.
II. RELATED WORK
At present, there are many studies on locating vulnerabilities of binaries, including spectrum-based fault localization [13] , [14] , execution-based fault localization [15] , modelbased fault localization [16] , and mutation-based fault localization [17] , etc. We only discuss researches relative to our work.
A. TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS
Traditional method of fault location mainly refers to manual debugging, which relies on debugging tools such as DBX and Microsoft VC++. This technique sets program breakpoints to debug repeatedly, and then analyzes the memory dump of crash locations to locate possible vulnerabilities. Manual debugging requires repeated load and execution of binary programs, which is inefficient and highly depends on the safety experience of developers.
B. STATIC ANALYSIS
The static methods research corresponding weakness patterns and mechanisms so as to predict, detect and locate vulnerabilities [18] , [19] . The static methods usually scan the source code and compare them with existing weakness patterns to identify the root causes of application crash. The static methods for modeling vulnerability mechanism suffer great difficulties, since the mechanism is quite complex and changeable, and it is not suitable for analyzing real-world programs.
C. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
Dynamic taint and dynamic symbolic execution technologies, which are often used to analyze the execution progress, can assist in analyzing and locating the vulnerabilities in binary. Dynamic taint analyzes the root cause of application crash by tainting unreliable data sources, tracing tainted data and observing the effects on application execution. Dynamic taint is quite effective when analyzing simple programs. However, as for complex applications, it suffers from low efficiency due to the large amount of tainted data. In 2005, TaintCheck [20] was designed by Newsome et al. as a typical dynamic taint tool for diagnosing software vulnerabilities. In 2016, Cui et al. proposed RETracer to locate binary vulnerabilities such as access violation by performing binary-level tainted analysis and obtaining crash states on the stack [21] .
Dynamic symbolic execution collects symbolic constraints during execution and solves through a constraint solver. However, when applied to large-scale software, it may encounter the problems of state explosion, control flow dependence and symbolic pointer caused by complex program branches. Based on dynamic symbolic execution and dynamic taint, Clause et al. proposed an automatic vulnerability diagnosis method for integer overflow [22] . This method is designed according to dynamic data flow tracking and symbolic execution slicing method, and could preliminary locate integer overflow.
D. EXECUTION-BASED ANALYSIS
The execution-based method analyzes the root cause of vulnerabilities by monitoring the data flow and control flow during program execution, such as execution trace and memory dump information [23] . Nowadays, researchers have proposed a series of fault localization methods based on program execution information. The main research idea of this method is to reverse the backtracking analysis to locate the vulnerability based on the program fault and the program state of the abnormal point.
Based on the function call graph, Wu et al. proposed a program crash recovery method CrashLocator, which can quickly locate the location of the vulnerability in the program [24] . The RETracer system developed by Cui et al. of Microsoft Corporation, could accurately locate the cause of the program error by analyzing the process of dereferencing the broken point of the crash point [21] . The CREDAL method proposed by Xu et al. of the University of Pennsylvania uses the control flow graph and the identification of data dependency mismatch to locate the software Vulnerability [25] . Additionally, Wang et al. proposed the deExploit method to locate the memory weakness in binary programs by identifying incorrect input data [26] .
The execution trace analysis is another popular fault location method, which records the running path for analysis [27] . In 2017, Microsoft proposed Time Travel Debugging technology based on Windbg platform, which dynamically analyzes execution trace [28] . Besides, they researched a typical memory vulnerability diagnosis tool within this method, which can preliminarily diagnose vulnerabilities such as out-of-bounds read and write, UAF, uninitialized use and null pointer dereference to determine the location of vulnerabilities triggered basically.
E. DEEP LEARNING METHODS
With the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) technology nowadays, the deep learning technology has already been applied to program analysis. Shin et al. first proposed a method of recognizing function boundaries based on recurrent neural networks, which is the first to leverage AI methods in vulnerability analysis [10] . Chua et al. implemented the identification of functional parameters based on deep learning and propsed EKLAVYA, which leverages GRU to recognize the number and type of function parameters [29] . Bao et al. proposed BYTEWEITHGT, which leverages machine learning techniques to recognize functions by automatically learning key features of program functions [9] .
Shi et al. proposed NEUZZ, which leverages gradientguided input generation method to improve the efficiency of fuzzing [30] . These work indicate that the deep learning methods could fit and analyze the program behaviors well, which provides idea for our work.
In the field of locate vulnerabilities in source code, some researches have been implemented based on AI technologies. Wong et al. first propose a machine learning method using backpropagation neural network to analyze software risk and locate suspicious executable statements in source code [31] . Zheng et al. propose a fault localization method based on deep neural networks, which also aims to find out the executable statements containing bugs from source code [12] . Based on these researches, Zhang et al. propose a deep learningbased fault localization method to evaluate the suspiciousness of statements, which leverages dynamic backward slicing to extract contextual information [32] . These researches focus on finding out suspicious executable statements of programs, but not for binary fault localization.
III. THEORETICAL BASIC
The method of this paper leverages execution traces during the software execution, which are composed of ordered basic block sequences. Generally, the program execution traces are divided into two categories, the crashed execution traces when the software triggers crash and the non-crashed execution traces. For these two types of execution traces, the basic blocks are executed in different orders. Particularly, the vulnerable location in the program must be processed in crashed traces while non-crashed traces do not execute it or execute this part differently. Based on that, it is implied that the basic block sequences at vulnerable location are closely related to the software crash or not, while other parts are not directly corresponding to the software crash. Hence, we could determine the basic blocks that causes the vulnerabilities by analyzing the effects of crash state, which means that we select the basic blocks that are most directly related to the program crash.
For a binary program, x represents the input of the program and y represents the various forms of program output. Each input is one-to-one corresponding with program output, that is f : { x} → { y}. Thus, the binary program can be expressed as y = F( x). In the paper, the program input x represents the program execution trace, and output y represents whether the execution trace triggers crash. We use the basic block sequence to represent the program execution path, that is
Hence, the relationships between B and y is y = F( B).
Considering that the function y = F( B) is discrete and non-differentiable, we need to construct a continuous differentiable function to fit the execution traces. Given the consideration that y = F( B) is a non-linear function, we decide to use NN regression method to fit the execution traces of binary programs. Since the NNs contain multiple layers, the NN regression has stronger applicability than logistic regression, and could fit arbitrarily complex functions theoretically [33] .
The execution sequences are regarded as the input to the NNs and we use y = F( B, θ) to show the fitting process of the NNs, where θ represents the parameters to be trained. It is noticed that y = F( B, θ) is a continuous differentiable function to fit the function y = F( B). Hence, we leverage y = F( B, θ) to locate the vulnerabilities.
To achieve the best fitting performances, the NNs should predict the output accurately. That is, the differences between the predicted value y with the true value y is as small as possible. The loss function is used to measure the differences, which could also reflect the network fitting result during training process. Among many loss functions, the cross entropy and the mean squared error (MSE) are two commonly used loss functions. The cross entropy function is normally applied to multi-classification problems while the mean squared error function is often applied to the regression problem [34] . Considering that the paper is to fit the execution traces and find out the vulnerable basic blocks from traces, we use the mean squared error function for regression problem as loss function in the paper, which is represented as:
where n represents the number of training samples, y i represents the true value of the i-th training data while y i represents the predicted value. Since the aim of NN fitting is to decrease the loss function, it implies that we obtain the optimal value of parameter θ in y = F( B, θ) to achieve best fitting results. The gradient descent method is usually used to optimize the loss function by updating θ. During training process, we could calculate the gradient of each input component based on loss function. For each input component b j in y = F( B, θ), the partial derivative of b j could reflect the impact on y. That is the partial derivative information of each basic block can reflect the extent of the basic block affecting the crash state. When the gradient value of basic block is large, it is indicated that the basic block has a great impact on the crash of execution trace, and further inferences could be drawn that the basic block is related to the vulnerability of program. Therefore, we calculate the partial derivative of
Therefore, the effects of each basic block on the i-th component of output could be obtained, which is
During the experiment, we are concerned about the basic blocks with larger gradients, that is, finding the basic blocks b k which satisfies g i k = max{g i 1 , g i 2 , g i 3 , . . . , g i n }. More specific solution of gradient calculation will be introduced thoroughly in Section V.
IV. METHODOLOGY A. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The design of the fault localization system DeepVL based on the gradient information is shown in Fig. 1 . Firstly, we use fuzzing test and mutation strategies to generate a large number of crashed program inputs and other normal inputs. Secondly, the target program dynamically runs with the inputs, and we use the binary instrumentation technology to track the execution process to generate two types of program execution traces. Thirdly, within the vectorization method of execution traces, we construct NNs to fit them and calculate the value of the gradient during training process. Finally, based on the gradient information, we leverage the statistical algorithm to find the basic blocks related to vulnerabilities.
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Locating the vulnerability in binary means to diagnose the root cause of the vulnerability, that is, to find the instructions or basic blocks that lead to a crash. In most cases, although the position of program crash is easy to find, the place of root cause is difficult to locate. In this paper, we focus on diagnosing the location of the root cause of vulnerability, rather than where the programs trigger crash. We will strictly distinguish the vulnerable basic blocks and the crash-related basic blocks.
The purpose of this paper is to locate the vulnerabilities in binary files, that is, to find the vulnerable basic block b v from the crash execution traces B = {b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , ...., b n }. Therefore, it is important to define the vulnerable basic blocks. We divide the basic blocks to be analyzed into three categories: vulnerability-related basic blocks, crash-related basic blocks, and other basic blocks. The vulnerabilityrelated basic blocks are what we need to locate and focus on, which have a direct relationship with the root cause of weakness. The crash-related basic blocks refer to the basic blocks when the programs crash, which are related to triggering crash but not the form of vulnerabilities. After running the vulnerable basic blocks, the programs usually execute with the end of breaking down, thus leading to the crash-related basic blocks. And other basic blocks represent other program functionalities, which have no direct relationships with the root cause of vulnerabilities.
To illustrate this in detail, Listing 1 shows an sample of a use-after-free vulnerability. In the example, we allocate a certain amount of space to the pointer a. After the memcpy operation, the space pointed by pointer a is released. And another memcpy operation is then performed on a,
LISTING. 1. A sample of use-after-free vulnerability.
which results in the vulnerability. In this program, the instructions at line 5, line 7, line 9 and line 13 are directly related to the root cause, and the basic blocks that they belong to are considered as vulnerable basic blocks. In addition, the crash is triggered when the program continues execution at line 16. The basic block of line 16 is crash-related basic block in this example.
C. WHY NNs?
Considering too many execution branches of binary programs, symbolic execution and other analysis methods may suffer from execution path explosion problem [35] , which results in low efficiency and much difficulty to locate the hidden flaws. Additionally, the complicated function call relationships increases the difficulty of fault localization undoubtedly. Such problems will become more serious in real-world software, so we choose NN methods to solve it.
Neural networks are currently widely used in the field of program analysis, especially in malware detection [6] and source code vulnerability discovery [36] - [38] . The NN regression could be used to fit complex program behaviors, such as the execution trace. Since the NNs consist of multiple layers within appropriate activation functions, the fitting performance is obviously better than traditional methods [33] , [39] . Considering that the real-world programs usually have large code size and many execution branches, which generates long basic block sequences, NNs have the advantages in processing the long sequences. At the same time, we could calculate derivatives easily and efficiently through NNs, which is quite important for the proposed method in this paper.
D. GRADIENT-GUIDED ROUGH DIAGNOSE METHOD
Given the consideration on the larger code scale of the programs, the sharp increase in the number of paths is the main challenge in locating binary vulnerabilities. How to identify the characteristics of the crash execution paths, and how to diagnose the vulnerable basic blocks from the crashed execution traces is the key problem to be solved in this paper.
For crashed execution traces and normal execution traces, the crashed traces will execute the vulnerable basic blocks, while the normal traces mostly do not execute the vulnerable basic blocks. Additionally, though the basic blocks in different crashed traces are not the same either, all crashed traces will execute the vulnerable basic blocks undoubtedly. This is basis for distinguish vulnerable basic blocks with other basic blocks. To illustrate this vividly, Fig. 2 Based on above analysis, the crashed execution traces all contain the vulnerable basic blocks, while the normal execution traces have no vulnerability-related basic blocks. It is indicated that the vulnerable basic blocks have the greatest influence on the crash state of programs. Thus, in this paper, we could determine the vulnerable basic blocks by analyzing the impacts on the program crash state. It is known from the theory in Section III that the impacts could be reflected by the partial derivative of the basic blocks in crashed execution traces. Hence, for the sequence B = {b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , ...., b n }, we calculate the partial derivative of the basic block through the NN fitting, and then select the basic blocks with the largest value of the gradient as vulnerable basic blocks. The specific calculation method will be described in detail in Section V-C.
E. STATISTICAL-BASED FILTERING METHOD
On basis of rough diagnosis method, we utilize the statistical algorithm to further filter out the vulnerable basic blocks, which is essential for improving the accuracy of locating weakness. It is inaccurate to determine the vulnerable basic blocks according to only one NN. The main reasons are (1) when we use the NNs to fit the program execution traces, the gradient declines randomly in each round of training network process. Thus, we usually obtain an uncertainty fitted network. (2) In the process of training, the fitting rate may not be high since the loss functions may coverage to the local minimum, and not every network is well-trained.
(3) Due to less training data and unreasonable structure of NN, over-fitting may occur. Although the NN has high fitting accuracy under this situation, it is not accurate enough to locate the vulnerability-related basic blocks. To avoid the limitations of only one NN, we determine to use multiple weighted NNs to diagnose the vulnerability-related basic blocks, which can reduce the prediction error.
V. IMPLEMENTATION A. EXECUTION TRACES GENERATION
In the paper, the execution traces of the binary are used as input of NNs. The more traces of programs we collect, the easier to distinguish the vulnerable basic blocks from others. Therefore, generating as many program execution traces as possible is the basis for diagnosing the vulnerability.
The key issue is to generate a large number of program inputs, which could trigger different execution paths. Based on one already-known test crashed input, we propose a mutation algorithm to obtain other crashed inputs. During each mutation round, only a few bytes are changed, so that the test cases generated by mutation could lead to different program paths with triggering the same vulnerability. As for normal program inputs, we use american fuzzy lop (AFL) to perform fuzz, and collect test cases each 10 times of fuzz mutation.
The mutation algorithm is shown as follows. In Algorithm 1, we change the input length and the content of the controllable input bytes, thus generating a large number of test cases to trigger crashed execution traces. SaveInput(new_input) 7: end for 8: end for 9: return new_input With a large number of test cases, we monitor the execution of programs through the binary instrumentation platform QEMU [40] , and record the execution path of the program.
Algorithm 1 Mutation Algorithm
The basic record unit of the execution trace is the basic block. Finally, we generate and classify plenty of crashed execution traces and normal execution traces as datasets.
B. NEURAL NETWORKS CONSTRUCTION 1) DATASET PREPARATION
The datasets in the paper are execution traces from binaries. In the experiment, we collect binary files from two widely used datasets, which are CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) datasets [41] and CGC (Cyber Grand Challenge) datasets [42] . CWE is a collection of lists containing program vulnerabilities to public access, which classifies most of the currently known vulnerabilities based on their root causes, constructing a commonly used dataset for software security test and vulnerability research. The CGC dataset collect programs from the automatic attack and defense competition Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC), the programs of which reflect the vulnerabilities in real-world software. Since the code size and complexity of challenges in CGC are closed to the realworld programs, many researchers use CGC dataset for test, making it a publicly standard dataset in software security. Additionally, to validate the applicability of DeepVL on realworld programs, we select LibTIFF 4.0.10 for test. LibTIFF is a toolset for reading and writing TIFF files on UNIX platforms, and researchers have discovered many vulnerabilities in this software. We list the programs used as datasets for training, which has shown in Table 1 . For each program, we use the execution trace generation technique to generate 5k crashed execution traces and 5k normal execution traces as datasets. Further, we divided collected data sets into training dataset and validation dataset in a 4:1 ratio.
2) EXECUTION TRACE EMBEDDING
To model the execution traces, we need to transform the sequences into vector acceptable for the NNs. The embedding methods including word2vec [43] , Skip-Gram [44] and CBOW [45] are usually used to vectorize continuous text. However, the basic block sequence, which is regarded as the input of the NNs, is discontinuous and semantically uncorrelated. Hence, we use the one-hot [46] modeling method to vectorize the basic blocks.
In the execution trace B = {b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , ...., b n }, when we use one-hot method, each basic block could be represented as a {0, 1} vector with the dimension of m * 1, where m represented the number of basic blocks appearing in the execution traces. Therefore, a complete execution trace B could be transformed into the matrix
where the dimension m of each vector is determined by the kinds of basic blocks, and the matrix length n represents the maximum length of execution traces. In order to ensure that all onehot vectors have the same dimensions, 0 is filled to the end of the vector for the execution traces whose length are less than n. One benifit of one-hot modeling is that the vector for each basic block is orthogonal, where only one element is set to 1 and others are set to 0. This ensures that the basic blocks are independent and do not affect each other while perform convolution operations afterwards, thus getting a better fitting result.
However, the problem of the one-hot vectorization method cannot be ignored. The dimension of one-hot vector could become extremely large so that it will bring much more training parameters to NNs. In real-world programs, the length of the execution traces often reaches 100,000 or even larger. Encoding these traces with one-hot could cause the explosions of input dimensions, thus leading to calculation resource exhaustion. Therefore, to model the traces in large-scale software, we design integer-mapped vectorization method.
For an execution sequence B = {b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , ...., b n }, where n is a large number, generally considered n > 10000, we map each basic block to a positive integer between 1 to m, where m is the kinds of basic blocks in B. For execution traces whose length does not reach n, we fill −1 into the vector to distinguish with other integers. Thus, we use the onedimension vector within length n to represent the execution trace, which is represented as {j|j ∈ −1, 1, 2, . . . , m} n .
This integer-mapped modeling method can effectively reduce the dimension of input vector, decreasing the dimension of vector from m × n to n. More importantly, fewer training parameters are required within this encoding method. However, each basic block in integer-mapped vector is in the same dimension, which affects each other during convolution operations. Hence, the training effect of integer-mapped modeling is not good as that of one-hot encoding method.
3) NEURAL NETWORK STRUCTURE
The accuracy of gradient-guided fault localization method in our paper relies on the fitting results of NNs. To construct a suitable NN, we mainly consider the NN structure, network parameters, and activation functions. Currently, recurrent neural networks (RNNs) [47] and convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [48] are two commonly used networks. Since our method uses the basic block sequence as the input of the NN, it seems to be a long sequence problem, and we should adapt RNNs such as LSTM [49] , and GRU [50] to fit them. However, we find that the networks based on CNNs have better effects than RNNs. Considering the large execution paths and the long execution traces, RNNs suffer from the slow convergence speed and the low training efficiency when process the large inputs. Compared with RNNs, CNNs leverage multiple convolutional layers to quickly process large amounts of data, thus fitting execution traces well. Additionally, we have no worry about gradient vanishing problem with CNNs when the gradient is degraded [51] . Based on above analysis, we construct a CNN which contains several convolutional layers and fully-connected layers to process the input.
To fit a non-linear function with NNs, the ReLU, Sigmoid and Tanh are considered as the activation functions of the output layer. However, the Sigmoid function may suffer from the gradient vanishing problem when there are many network layers [52] . Moreover, since the input of the NN is nonnegative, the Tanh function is not applicable to the network. Therefore, we choose ReLU (Rectified Linear units) function as the output of the activation function [53] . The ReLU function has higher convergence speed than that of Sigmoid and Tanh functions, and ReLU avoids the gradient vanishing problem. However, considering that the ReLU function completely discards all negative value, there may be a dying RelU during training. Therefore, we use the PReLU instead of ReLU as the activation function of output layer, whose negative part is not all 0. It is worth mentioning that the PReLU does not bring large amount of calculation and the risk of over-fitting.
When fit the execution traces, we select the mean squared error (MSE) function as the loss function. The MSE function is often used in regression problems [54] , which has no gradient vanishing problem compared to the cross-entropy function. In addition, we use Adam gradient descent optimization algorithm for network training, which converges fast and effectively prevents the convergence to local minimum. Moreover, Batch Normalization is used to normalize the output of each convolutional layer to prevent data from slow convergence or gradient explosion problems. Based on above analysis, the constructed NNs are listed in Table 2 . Our experimental environment is Ubuntu 18.04 with the graphics card NVIDIA GTX 1080Ti. We built and trained the model on Keras 2.2.14 with Tensorflow as backend. The epoch in training is set to 10 and the batch size is 32. The NN model constructed in the paper mainly includes multiple convolutional layers and fully connected layers, in which each convolutional layer uses PReLU as the activation function, and each convolutional layer is standardized by Batch Normalization.
C. GRADIENT-GUIDED ROUGH DIAGNOSE METHOD
In this paper, how to diagnose the vulnerable basic blocks from the large amount of basic blocks in the crashed execution trace is a key issue. This section elaborates the method of selecting vulnerable basic blocks based on gradient information.
For a well-fitted NN y = F( B, θ) , where B = {b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , ...., b n } represents the basic block sequence, and θ represents the training parameters of the NN. We calculate the partial derivatives for each basic block based on the welltrained network. Assuming that y i is the i-th component of the NN output, we get the partial derivative of the j-th basic block B j , which can be expressed as g i j = ∂(y i )/∂B j , where i, j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , n, and n represents the length of the execution trace. The larger of the gradient is, the greater the basic block affects the crash state, which indicates the basic block is more likely to be the vulnerable basic block. To represent the effect of the basic block on the NN output, we map the negative gradient value to a positive value, i.e. g i Aj = |g i j |. Similarly, as for the input vector encoded with integermapped method I n = {j|j ∈ {−1, 1, 2, . . . , m}} m , partial derivative G i of each dimension of output y i to the basic block could be represented by G i = {g i 1 , g i 2 , . . . , g i n }, where n represents the length of the input execution traces. And the gradient to be analyzed is the absolute value of g i k , that is
D. STATISTICAL ALGORITHM
Due to the complexity of the dataset and randomly initialization of parameters, the NNs may face the problems of underfitting or over-fitting. Thus, errors in fault localization are easily to occur only based on gradient information of one single NN. In order to increase the robustness and accuracy of the proposed method, we select multiple NNs to analyze the gradient information. Considering that fitting rates of different NNs are different, which have a great influence on the identification effect of the vulnerable basic blocks, we take the fitting accuracy of NN as an important factor. Assuming the accuracy of the trained NN is a, where a ∈ (0, 1), the NN could be represented as y = F NN ( B, θ) . As mentioned above, the gradient information of the i-th output component to the j-th basic block is
Taking the accuracy of the NN into consideration, the gradient to be analyzed could be represented as a * GA i j . Hence, we train multiple NNs NN 1 , NN 2 ,. . . and NN P with the same dataset, each of which is trained with 20 rounds. For each NN, we calculate the average training accuracy of 20 rounds, thus obtaining the fitting accuracy for each NN, which is {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a p }, where the a k = a ki /20, k ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., P}. The gradient {GA i j |i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}} of NN is multiplied by average accuracy, thus getting a weightedgradient vector. Then, we sum up all weighted-gradient vectors of different NNs, and the total gradient information of VOLUME 7, 2019 the i-th output component to the j-th basic block could be represented as {GS i j = p k=1 a k * GA i kj |i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}}. The weighted-gradient information could comprehensively measure the performance of each network, and avoid the random error with one single NN. Even if a single network is not trained well with low fitting accuracy, since the weight coefficient is small, it will have little impact on the total gradient information. − → GS ← P 1 − → wG 9: end for 10: for g ∈ − → GS do 11: if g ∈ top − N ( − → GS) then 12: Gratitude_List.apped(g) 13: end if 14: end for 15: return Gratitude_List
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. MEASUREMENTS
It is worthy of discussion that how to select the approximately criterion to measure the performance of fault localization system since there is no unified standard to quantitatively analyze the performance of vulnerability locating system. The EXAM score is a measurement proposed by Wong et al. in [55] , which refers to the percentage of code that has to be examined until the first location of bugs is found. However, EXAM has difficulty in measuring the performance of system comprehensively. When diagnosing vulnerabilities, developers are looking forward to locating the weakness as accurately as possible. Thus, we consider effectiveness and accuracy as important criterions of the fault localization system.
Ideally, the vulnerability diagnose system should locate all of the vulnerable basic blocks with no false positive. However, it is nearly impossible. To measure the effectiveness of our method, missing report is the first to be considered, as developers may cost much time to search the vulnerabilities due to the missing report of system. Moreover, since reporting many unrelated basic blocks will increase subsequent analytical workload for developers, a good locating system should report unrelated basic blocks as few as possible.
Based on the analysis above, we use Recall@N and Precison@N to measure the effectiveness and accuracy of system. Recall@N refers to the Recall of the Top − N basic blocks reported by the system while Precision@N refers to the precision of Top − N located basic blocks. Top − N basic blocks refer to the first N basic blocks found by system, which have larger gradient. Recall@N and Precision@N are calculated as:
Number of selected vulnerable basic blocks
Total number of vulnerable basic blocks
Number of selected vulnerable basic blocks Total number of selected basic blocks
In (2) and (3), N v represents the number of vulnerable basic blocks contained in the N basic blocks, and T v represents the total number of basic blocks of all vulnerabilities in the program. To research the loPcating performance, we perform experiments to quantitatively calculate the Recall@N and Precison@N with different N values. In our experiments, we select plenty of vulnerabilities with six types from the CWE datasets [41] and calculate the average Recall@N and average Precision@N for each type of vulnerabilities. Fig. 3 shows the Recall and Precision with different Top − N basic blocks. When diagnosing a vulnerability, it is first essential to locate the vulnerable basic blocks as many as possible. That is, the Recall of the locating system should be as large as possible. Seen from the figure, the Recall basically reaches 1 when N ≥ 10, which indicates that in the Top−10 basic blocks, most of the vulnerable basic blocks could be located. Additionally, the Precision is relatively large at N = 10, and keeps falling when N is greater than 10. Therefore, we select the Top − 10 basic blocks for further analysis, which means that the first 10 basic blocks with the largest absolute value of gradients are reported by DeepVL. Within these two measurements, the Recall and Precision of the system reach the maximum, thus making DeepVL system both efficient and accurate.
B. AN EXPERIMENT ON CWE BINARY
We use programs from CWE datasets [41] , which classifies most of the currently known vulnerabilities based on root causes. Thus, we could evaluate the applicability of our method on different kinds of weakness. In this part, to show the results of our method thoroughly, we first introduce an example of locating the vulnerability with DeepVL.
Taking CWE122-Heap-Overflow as an example, we sort the Top − 10 basic blocks with the largest gradient information and compare with the static analysis results by IDA pro v6.8. Table 3 shows the analysis results of reported basic blocks.
Specifically, the vulnerability of CWE122-Heap-Overflow is triggered due to uncheck of the memcpy function. The size of the destination operation is set to 16 bytes, and the input string size is 32 bytes. Hence, overflow is triggered when calling the memcpy function. Correspondingly, the execution of instruction rep movsd for 5 to 8 times causes the weakness. After triggering the vulnerability, functions printLine and _puts are called, and the program crashes when returning to the main function as the overflowed bytes cover the return address of printLine. Based on analysis above, vulnerable basic blocks refer to the rep movsd instruction for 5 to 8 executing times, which has been highlighted with red in the table. And crash-related basic blocks are indicated with yellow in the table.
As can be seen, the diagnosed basic blocks mainly include three types: the vulnerability-related basic blocks, the crash-related basic blocks, and unrelated basic blocks. It is important to distinguish the recommended vulnerable basic blocks from other basic blocks. We find that the recommended vulnerable basic blocks are usually continuous in position. Additionally, the vulnerable basic blocks are not located at the end of the execution traces, which is significantly different from the location of the crashedrelated ones. Despite that, further analysis on the reported basic blocks should be implemented to diagnose accurately. Thus, we leverage IDA pro v6.8 for static analysis of target binary to obtain the instructions and functionalities. According to static analysis information of these reported basic blocks, we finally infer the vulnerable basic blocks.
C. EXPERIMENTS ON DIFFERENT TYPES OF VULNERABILITIES
Based on the detailed analysis above, we perform a series of experiments to explore the performances of DeepVL for locating different types of fault. We collect 12 types of vulnerabilities in the CWE datasets and compile 50 binary programs for each type of vulnerability. For each binary program, we collect 5k crashed execution traces and 5k normal execution traces as training dataset. Considering that the dimension of the traces is not particularly large, we leverage one-hot embedding to model it, and then use the NN constructed in Section V-B to train them and calculate the gradients. We calculate the average of Recall@10 and Precision@10 for each type of vulnerability. The experimental results are listed in Table 4 . Conclusions could be drawn that the overall Recall@10 could reach 0.969 and the Precision@10 could reach 0.701.
D. EXPEREMENTS ON NNs
To investigate the fitting results of NNs, we study the experimental performances with different network parameters. The number of NN layers affects the fitting performances greatly. With the increasing number of NN layers, not only the amount of training parameters grows exponentially, but also the overfitting is easy to occur. Besides, the decreasing number of NN layers may lead to poor network fitting effect and long training time. This part researches the effect of the amount of convolutional layers on the NN fitting results.
The parameters of each convolutional layer also affect the training effects, which mainly include the kernel size, the stride size of the convolution, and the number of filters. The small convolutional kernel size is commonly used nowadays. Considering that the contextual basic blocks have certain relationships, which trigger the functionalities of program together, too small kernel size is unsuitable to reflect the correlation of basic blocks. According to specific experiments, we find that the training effect reaches the best when the kernel size is between 5 and 7, and the stride size is set to 2.
Based on parameters above, we construct several convolutional layers to explore the influence on the fitting accuracy and fitting time. For different execution traces, we select one-hot embedding method and the integer-mapped method respectively. Fig. 4 shows that the number of convolutional layers is positively correlated with the length of the execution trace. For smaller trace length, setting the amounts of convolutional layers to 3 has a better fitting accuracy. If the trace length reaches tens of thousands, setting 8 to 10 convolutional layers can fit with less time and higher accuracy. Therefore, we construct 3 convolutional layers for small length of execution traces and 10 convolutional layers for the long traces.
Additionally, we research the fitting time of two different input model methods, which is shown in Fig.5 . We find that though one-hot model has a higher fitting accuracy than the integer-mapped method, it takes more training time. As the length of the execution traces increases, the dimension of one-hot vector increases squarely and the long sequences with one-hot may take tens of minutes. Therefore, for long execution traces, we select the integer-mapped method for modeling input.
E. EXPERIMENTS ON CGC
To verify the effectiveness of DeepVL on the large-scale programs, this paper selects the binary programs in the CGC dataset [42] . The code of CGC programs is quite complex and the execution path is large enough, which is close to realworld software. Many researchers have carried out specific analysis for root cause of vulnerabilities in CGC dataset, which helps us to analyze the results of DeepVL.
The restriction of leveraging CGC dataset is that the crash program inputs are usually difficult to discover, especially for heap-related vulnerabilities. This paper selects CROMU_00055 (also named Network_File_System) in the CGC dataset, and vulnerability of it occurs when the CallocAndRead( ) function is called, which is used to allocate space to hold the values of the calling function and copy values into the allocated buffer. The incorrect declaration of the function causes the argument length to be passed as an unsigned 8-bit integer. And a heap overflow will occur when the function is called with a value of 255. In the program, We use the integer-mapped vector to model the execution traces and construct a NN containing 10 convolutional layers. Combining with the static analysis by IDA pro v6.8, we give the diagnose results in Table 5 . We highlight the vulnerable basic blocks with red and the crash-related basic blocks with yellow. It can be seen that DeepVL accurately locates all vulnerable basic blocks, indicating that DeepVL could deal well with a large-scale software with complicated function call and long execution path.
F. LOCATING VULNERABILITIES IN LibTIFF
This section selects the real-world software LibTIFF 4.0.10 version [56] to diagnose the vulnerability. In the experiments, we discover a new triggered crash when executing the tiffcp command using an improved fuzzing technique [57] . We use DeepVL to locate the vulnerable basic blocks to verify the effect of the proposed method on diagnosing real-world software.
Since the execution traces of leveraging tiffcp to process TIFF file could be quite long, we use integer-mapped vector to model the execution traces. The execution of tiffcp requires the library libtiff.so.5.4. Hence, based on the localization results of Top − 10 basic blocks, we filter them and select 5 basic blocks which are most likely to be the vulnerable basic blocks. Combining with the further static analysis, we find them all in the TIFFFindField( ) function, which processes the parameter tif, key, and pkey. The subsequent analysis could be implemented based on the diagnosed vulnerabilitiy location.
G. COMPARISON WITH OTHER BASELINES
Nowadays, many researches about the binary fault localization have been implemented. Nevertheless, many methods VOLUME 7, 2019 are far from practical, and their locating capability in realworld software remains to be improved. Among these tools, we select the binary vulnerability locating tool CrashLocator and CREDAL as baselines for comparison with DeepVL. Also, we compare our methods with another fault localization method based on deep learning. The cross-comparison results have been listed in Table 7 .
CrashLocator leverages crash stack information and static analysis techniques to locate vulnerable functions in programs, which is proposed by Wu et al. [24] . Based on the source code of programs, CrashLocator extracts the function call diagram through static analysis. Then, CrashLocator combines the crash report of the software and the crash stack information to backtrack, and finally completes the identification of the vulnerable functions.
We compare DeepVL in this paper with the CrashLocator from the following aspects: 1) Versatility. The DeepVL tool requires less program information. When diagnosing binary weakness, DeepVL only needs binary files, and CrashLocator relies on source code of the program to extract the function call graph and stack crash report. 2) Effectiveness. According to the experimental results by Wu CREDAL [25] is a tool developed by Xu et al. to locate a memory vulnerability in binary. This method is based on the core dump information during running. CREDAL extracts the control flow graph based on binary, and leverages stack information compiled from source code. Then, CREDAL tracks the execution trace and locates the vulnerable position according to stack information. In the study of the paper, a large number of experiments prove the applicability of the CREDAL to most memory corruption vulnerabilities.
We compare DeepVL with CREDAL and conclusions could be drawn that: 1) Although CREDAL is designed for locating vulnerabilities in binaries, it still relies on source code to obtain stack call information to track the stack execution process. Meanwhile, CREDAL uses stack analysis technology based on the UNIX platform, which is not applicable to the Windows platform. Compared to CREDAL, DeepVL focuses on the basic block execution sequence of the program, which does not depend on the specific operating systems 2) CREDAL leverages abundant memory state information besides control flow information, thus having a better effect on real-world software than DeepVL.
In 2016, Zheng et al. propose a fault localization method based on deep neural network (DNN) [12] , which leverages DNN to find out suspicious executional statements in programs. This approach utilizes the coverage data with corresponding execution results to train the network, and uses the coverage of virtual test cases to obtain the suspiciousness of the executable statements in the source code. According to the experiments, the DNN-based method is able to identify 73.77% faulty versions by examining 10% of statements in Siemens suite and find out all faults by examining 7% statements in Space program.
Comparing DNN-based method with DeepVL, we could conclude that the DNN-based method is a good application of deep neural network technology to fault localization, which aims to find out suspicious statements in source code. DeepVL method proposed in our paper focuses on detecting vulnerable basic block, which only relies on binary files. Moreover, DeepVL could reduce more workload than DNN-based method when handling the big-scale programs, since hundreds of statements needs to be examined in Space program by DNN-based method. Additionally, the DNNbased method might suffer from the problems of oversized model when dealing with large-scale software, which could restrict the application to real-world programs.
VII. EVALUATION
According to the experimental results in Section VI, the advantages of DeepVL proposed in this paper are as follows: 1) The method based on execution traces has strong applicability. DeepVL is used to locate the vulnerabilities in binaries, which only requires the binary files to generate a large amount of program execution traces for analysis without source code, compilation information, crash report or other stack information.
2) The method could diagnose multiple types of vulnerabilities, which has high locating accuracy. According to the experiments, we have tested 12 types of vulnerability programs in CWE dataset. 3) The method uses deep neural networks to fit program execution traces, which does not rely on artificially defined rules and requires no modeling of multiple vulnerability patterns and memory states.
On the other hand, DeepVL has the following disadvantages: 1) First, it takes longer time to analyze target programs, as the method leverages fuzzing technique, vector modeling, and NN training to acquire, process, and fit execution traces. According to the experiments, this process may reach ten or dozens of minutes to locate vulnerabilities in real-world software. 2) DeepVL uses one-hot modeling method and integer-mapped method to model the execution traces. The one-hot embedding method undoubtedly fits better, but when the execution trace is longer and the basic block category is larger, one-hot modeling faces decline of efficiency and even leads to exhaustion of computing resources. Therefore, we use integer-mapped method to model long execution traces, though the accuracy of it is not as high as that of onehot method, which is one of the challenges faced by DeepVL. 3) To obtain the best fitting performances, the structure of NN model may vary with different traces. Though we have given a 3-layer model and a 10-layer model in Section VI, the number of convolutional layers for best model could be slightly different, which depends on the length of traces.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In summary, the paper combines deep neural networks technique to propose a new method for locating vulnerability in binary program and providing guidance information for further analysis. Based on that, the paper develops a binary fault localization tool DeepVL. To the best of our knowledge, DeepVL is the first tool to combine NN with binary vulnerability location. DeepVL collects two types of execution traces and constructs the NN to fit them. By analyzing the relationship between the basic block gradient and the execution trace crash state, we propose the method of selecting vulnerable basic blocks according to gradient information. Finally, combining with the statistical algorithm, we filter the basic blocks with largest gradient as the vulnerable basic blocks.
We have implemented a series of experiments to verify the locating performances of the DeepVL. It has been proved that DeepVL has an average accuracy of 70.1% for locating multiple types of vulnerability under the premise of nearly missing no vulnerable basic blocks. Additionally, the experiments on CGC dataset and LibTIFF prove that DeepVL has a good locating effect on real-world programs. Compared with most current binary vulnerability locating methods, DeepVL only relies on binary programs and requires no further information such as source code, debugging information, crash reports, or crash stack information.
In future work, considering that when the execution trace length is large, it costs much time to train the NNs, the modeling method and training method need to be improved. In addition, the proposed method leverages the program execution traces, which reflects the control flow information, but the data flow information of the program is not used. Therefore, DeepVL can only assist in locating the vulnerability, but cannot analyze the root causes more specifically. Hence, we decide to model the memory state of the vulnerabilities to further analyze the causes of vulnerabilities in the future. 
